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Gramsci and the crisis of neoliberal transformismo  
 
Abstract 
In this paper I return to Gramsci in an effort to situate the current financial crisis 
within his conception of transformismo. Neoliberalism became a project of 
repositioning compulsory class interests in social space. Outside of elite groups 
neoliberalism did not become routinised as a compelling hegemonic force for 
cognitive conservatism as ideologikritiks claim. What became more fully 
routinised was a structuring war of position in social space through the 
monotonous compulsion for credit-worthy individuals to market, sell, purchase 
and perform for money-wages. New techniques of the self were perfected in the 
marketised war of positioning to service the increasingly financialisation of 
everyday life that came to characterise neoliberalism. Social positionings 
dependent on financialisation are now subject to a ‘crisis of authority’. 
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Gramsci and the crisis of neoliberal transformismo  
 
‘The crisis consists precisely in the fact that the old is dying and the 
new cannot be born; into the interregnum a great variety of morbid 
symptoms appear’. (Gramsci, 1971: 276). 
 
 
Introduction 
For some the ‘credit crunch’ and deepening recession spells the death knell of 
neoliberalism as a definite set of ideological assumptions for organising social 
life. Martin Jacques (2009: 13), for instance, argues that neoliberalism 
represented a ‘decisive shift in the centre of gravity of power in society: from 
the state to the market, from society to the individual, from relatively egalitarian 
values to the embrace of inequality’. Neoliberalism has now ‘imploded’, 
dislodged not by an alternative ideology but by the blind force of ‘events’. 
Alongside sociology luminaries like Stuart Hall, Jacques pioneered the analysis 
of Thatcherism in the 1980s as a hegemonic force essential for the consumer-
led modernisation of Ukania and the forced realignment of an ‘obsolete’ labour 
movement (Hall and Jacques, 1983, 1989). This argument was developed most 
insistently in Marxism Today, the now defunct magazine of the now defunct 
Communist Party of Great Britain, which Jacques edited from 1977 to 1991. 
Returning to his Gramscian cradle, Jacques (2009: 13) claims that as 
neoliberalism became hegemonic as an ideology over the past three decades it 
‘acquired such dominance at all levels of society, from the person in the street 
to the man at No 10 – to the point where it has acquired the force of common 
sense’.  
Underpinning Jacques’ vision of neoliberalism’s totalising hegemony is an 
assumption about the cognitive inertia of social agents, what he calls ‘the 
mind’s natural conservatism’. In this approach, ideologies that have sunk to the 
level of routines, habits and reflexes are not easily relinquished, even if distinct 
ideological alternatives can be counter-posed. In the current crisis, Jacques 
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laments the fact that no coherent intellectual alternative has appeared in 
Britain, certainly not from within the ranks of New Labour that so firmly nailed its 
fate to neoliberal apologetics. Without a hint of irony, Jacques (2009: 13) 
lambasts the intellectual dearth at the heart of the New Labour fixation with 
neoliberalism that he personally did so much to stimulate: ‘New Labour itself 
came largely from Thatcherism, and the critique of Old Labour and 
understanding of Thatcherism from my old magazine, Marxism Today’. 
Ideologikritiks like Jacques explain the current crisis as a question primarily of 
ideological agility and cognitive inertia. They reproduce the ‘scholastic fallacy’ 
that privileges the enunciated tenets of political ideology over the phenomenal 
structuring of the social world. As Bourdieu was fond of putting it, paraphrasing 
Marx, this conflates ‘things of logic’ with the ‘logic of things’. It collapses formal 
theories about society into a metaphysics of practice. Much of the sub-
Gramscian approach to hegemony pictures the social world as being formed by 
a clash of distinct political ideologies, one of which becomes dominant and 
eventually makes its way through all levels of social life to ensconce itself deep 
into the heart and soul of individual subjects.  
While neoliberalism certainly marked a general shift in the structuring effects of 
capital accumulation on everyday life, as I will argue below, this was not quite 
the same thing as ideological hegemony. My claim is that that neoliberalism did 
not become what Gramsci (1971: 421ff) called a great ‘national-popular 
collective will’ since its reasons bypassed society in general. It did not emerge 
as a deus ex machina to function as a totalising hegemon permeating the 
interstices of social life. To understand the present relationship between crisis 
and ideology Gramsci’s historical sociology continues to provide a useful if 
sketchy framework. This enables us to retrace the history of neoliberalism as 
an ideological movement from above, or what Gramsci called a ‘transformismo’. 
Second, it throws light on the ‘purification’ of capital as a social relation of 
compulsion through the financialisation of everyday life.  
 
Gramsci and neoliberal transformismo 
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While neoliberalism has been imposed worldwide by global agencies of social 
compulsion such as the World Bank, IMF, and WTO, in the UK it possessed 
original, organic national qualities. Unfortunately, there has been little 
engagement with the concept of neoliberalism by institutional sociology in 
Britain. For instance, a content search of articles in the discipline’s leading 
journal Sociology between January 1989 and May 2009 reveals that the 
concept ‘neoliberalism’ was used in a mere 14 articles out of a total of 2565 
pieces. This contrasts with sociology in France, for instance, where 
neoliberalism became the object of a public sociology represented above all by 
the efforts of Pierre Bourdieu to connect with the social movements contesting 
neoliberal priorities in order to defend society from corrosion by market 
fundamentalism. For a decade and more Bourdieu (2008) assailed 
neoliberalism as an ‘infernal logical machine’ unleashed by a ‘new planetary 
vulgate’ committed to imposing on society universal, which is to say an arbitrary 
belief in ‘deregulation’, ‘flexibility’, ‘employability’, ‘shareholder value’ and so on.  
The conceptual lacuna of neoliberalism in UK sociology requires more 
reflection than I can attempt here. Perhaps the beginnings of an explanation lie 
in the changing nature of neoliberalism in the UK. Jamie Peck and Adam Tickell 
(2007) delineate the chronology of neoliberalism into a first phase of ‘roll-back 
neoliberalism’ followed by a second phase of ‘roll-out neoliberalism’. ‘Roll-back 
neoliberalism’, popularised as Thatcherism or Reaganism after its leading 
protagonists in the 1980s, refers to the first wave of destructive and 
deregulatory attacks on the state and the liberalisation of ‘free’ markets as the 
solution to crisis conditions. ‘Roll-out neoliberalism’ of the 1990s and 2000s is 
viewed as the consolidation of the changed conditions for capital accumulation 
through the pragmatic invention of new, often indirect regulatory rewards and 
punishments, encapsulated in the UK by New Labour ideas about the Third 
Way (Giddens, 1998). This double movement of anti-state deregulation and 
pro-market re-regulation is not especially unique to neoliberalism but repeats a 
signature theme of capitalism from its earliest days (Polanyi, 1944; 
Drahokoupil, 2004). As society becomes embedded in the market, rather than 
the market being embedded within society, social movements – from Chartism 
to environmentalism - emerge to protect society from the market’s destructively 
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atomising logic descending on the ‘fictitious commodities’ of land, labour and 
money. 
This double movement of neoliberalism recalls the process characterised by 
Gramsci (1971: 58) as ‘transformismo’. This refers to a broad convergence in 
the programmes of elite cadres of political parties historically divided into Left 
and Right. Transformismo is one of the forms that a ‘passive revolution’ can 
take. Gramsci identifies a two stage process of transformismo in the ‘passive 
revolution’ of the Italian Risorgimento. First, ‘molecular’ transformismo occurs 
where formally radical individual politicians are incorporated into a merely 
dominating conservative political class and, second, an ‘organic’ transformismo 
arises where entire layers of formerly radical political elites are absorbed en 
bloc by a hegemonic ruling political formation. This remains a ‘passive 
revolution’ since it does not engage wider groups, principally subaltern social 
classes, in the national population. It is a process confined mainly to the 
ideological reconfiguration of elite groups. All that is left for political elites to 
struggle over are the petty issues of personalities and cliques rather than 
fundamental ideological cleavages. As such, a passive revolution is largely 
indifferent to winning popular consent or approval. Instead it attempts to reduce 
subaltern groups to a ‘passive citizenry’, inert objects to be manipulated from 
above. Hence large swathes of the population neither absorb the dominating 
ideology of the day into their routine dispositions nor identify strongly with the 
ideological leadership of the political class. 
Such a convergence of political elites and popular disenchantment with the 
political class can be clearly charted in Britain. At the level of political elites, 
first, a layer of right-wing labourist politicians broke from the Labour Party, 
some to form the Social Democratic Party, in an effort to enter the emerging 
neoliberal coalition. Later, an increasingly successful ideology of ‘new realism’ 
was propounded by Labour leaders from Neil Kinnock to Tony Blair. In the sub-
Gramscian discourse of the time ideological ‘realignment’ became necessary 
among elites to form a new political bloc that endorsed the fundamental tenets 
of market neoliberalism and, in the process, marginalised their own ‘obsolete’ 
left-wing opponents. The ultimate coup de grâce for many rightwards moving 
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labourist politicians was the collapse of the Stalinist regimes in 1989. New 
Labour therefore represented the political embodiment of transformismo under 
conditions of neoliberal convergence. Where fundamentalist market ideology is 
shared across the political spectrum the only remaining marks of distinction are 
the competing celebrity brands of the petty personalities jostling for position. 
 
Neoliberalism: from a war of movement to a war of positioning 
In Gramsci’s analysis of Italian history, molecular transformismo corresponds to 
a ‘war of manoeuvre or movement’ while organic transformismo is related to a 
‘war of position’. Such military metaphors were adopted by Gramsci (1971: 108-
110, 229-235, 238-239, passim) to explain the shifting bases of hegemonic 
struggles.1 A war of movement occurs where a rapid direct assault destroys 
enemy forces. A war of position emerges as a longer-term strategy, as when a 
colonial army occupies on a more permanent basis the conquered territory after 
dispersing vanquished military enemies. A war of position will tend to 
characterise societies that develop complex intermediate institutions of civil 
society. Individual nations must be reconnoitred in terms of their own terrain 
and fortresses to assess the precise relationship between state and civil 
society. Gramsci (1971: 238) describes western civil societies in terms of trench 
warfare characteristic of the war of position; where civil society is weak, as in 
Russia in 1917, a war of movement is favoured.  
In actual socio-political struggles this neat demarcation is more messy and 
confused than the metaphor suggests. Nevertheless, a war of movement 
roughly corresponds with the phase of ‘roll-back neoliberalism’ and a war of 
position with the ‘roll-out’ stage. First, the machinery of state and mass 
communications was mobilised as a ‘catharsis machine’ to break-up and 
demoralise the enemy, specifically organised labour and public services, 
through the shock tactics of dramatic one-off set-piece struggles to assert one’s 
domination of the field. In the 1980s the war of manoeuvre included the use of 
the state apparatus to break the counter-force of organised labour, culminating 
in the Miners Strike, but also to privatise public utilities, sell council housing, 
  8 
deregulate financial institutions, through to the introduction of the Poll Tax. 
While this unfolded pragmatically enough on a tactical assessment of 
contending forces and while ideological appeals were made for a ‘popular 
capitalism’, the main drift of Conservative government from the second term to 
the Poll Tax debacle (1983-1990) was for neoliberal policies to dominate the 
political field through rapid, determined manoeuvres directed from the centre. 
Such movement was less concerned with popular hegemony than with 
subjugating opponents to accept neoliberal realities. Although neoliberalism 
looked unassailable to ideologikritiks it was pervaded by a continual ‘crisis of 
authority’ as political elites, especially social democratic elites, disentangled 
themselves from their traditional ideologies in the course of transformismo 
(Gramsci, 1971: 211). 
Following the mass resistance to the Poll Tax a shift to a war of position 
becomes evident. Working on the intermediate institutions of civil society to 
supplement coercive state authority, a sustained attempt was made to 
consolidate, deepen and entrench market fetishism as an abstract form of 
social compulsion (Mészáros, 1995). While this had hegemonic aspects these 
remained mainly confined to political elites and the higher strata of the new 
middle class. Shareholder fundamentalism and managerialism conspired to 
demand that organisational and personal change become a way of life through 
the ‘spontaneous’ regulation of the self as a flexible, adaptable and available 
neoliberal subject. Entrenched by the war of position or, in more Bourdieusian 
terms, a ‘war of positioning’, employee performance was managed through 
remote controls including information technologies, numerical targets, internal 
competition, bonus culture and stringent accounting measurements.  
 
Financialisation as a war of positioning 
In the marketplace, financialisation functioned as compulsory force in the 
neoliberal war of repositioning. Financialisation as a style of life was rooted in 
the value structure of elite professions, strikingly different from the ascetic 
morality of the traditional petty bourgeoisie or the post-war corporate 
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reorganisation of the propertied classes. Manager-entrepreneurs were 
rewarded not only with substantial salaries but also, increasingly, financialised 
incentives like financial performance-related pay and stock options. But 
financialisation refers to a much wider process: the deepening financialisation 
of everyday life. Goods and services essential to a culturally tolerable style of 
life are made available less on the basis of an immediate cash transaction or 
public transfer than in the form of personal creditworthiness to purchase 
essential and desired goods. Record levels of personal indebtedness were 
enforced through mortgages, personal loans, credit cards, mail-order catalogue 
accounts, and so on. This is fool’s gold, a hallucinatory mirage of affluence and 
desire, temporarily compensating for the degraded value of money-wages. 
Financialisation represented a historical shift in the circuits of credit, distribution 
and production. From the pawnshop, savings clubs, and the post-war HP 
(Higher Purchase) culture everyday life passed over to the ubiquitous 
financialisation culture of the past few decades (O’Connell and Reid, 2005; 
Taylor, 2002). More systemically, marketised bondage was enforced by this 
wider financialisation of society. On the one hand, credit unlocks commodities 
for labour as consumer; one the other, credit locks labour as producer into 
workplace domination. Credit advances immediate purchasing power against 
the future perfect, final repayment and, therefore, legal ownership of the object 
is deferred. But, by then the use value of the object will be spent, either through 
its cultural obsolescence or its physical state of disrepair.  
Financialisation’s lasting function is to sustain the endless circuit of production, 
distribution and consumption of commodities (Baudrillard, 2005). At each stage 
an extra sum is surrendered as interest or profit. This additional value needs to 
be extracted from somewhere within the circuit. Paid employment comes to be 
experienced as a deeply coercive logic to finance personal indebtedness. This 
Sisyphean circuit allows immediate possession of the commodity so that 
production may continue, so that wage labour continues to work, so that wages 
cover the next scheduled repayment. Time becomes warped in the forlorn 
hours spent attempting to catch up with the monetary value of the commodity, 
which has now escaped the present to dominate further stretches of working 
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time. In the process, individuals mortgage their future in a master-stroke of self-
alienation: the same person as consumer is alienated from their later self as 
payer.  
 
Conclusion 
Neoliberalism evolved as a project for repositioning compulsory class interests 
in social space. But beyond elite social groups neoliberal ideology did not 
therefore become routinised as a compelling force for cognitive conservatism 
as ideologikritiks claim. What became more fully routinised was a war of 
positioning in social space through the monotonous compulsion for credit-
worthy individuals to market, sell, purchase and perform for money-wages to 
finance personal indebtedness. New techniques of the self were perfected in 
the marketised war of positioning to service the increasingly financialisation of 
everyday life that came to characterise neoliberalism. Credit’s spectral 
presence seemed to stave off the crisis of capital accumulation for a while. With 
neoliberalism’s attempt to free money from earthly restrictions deregulation 
stimulated an opaque financial architecture of perverse incentives, re-
enchanting money as a promissory note, before becaming completely unhinged 
by speculation that it might expand itself indefinitely. 
Cultural and educational goods were mobilised to occupy strategic positionings 
in the social relations of compulsion. Today the crisis threatening the 
dissolution of neoliberalism is also a crisis of accumulation and legitimacy 
(Silver, 2003). This confirms Polanyi’s (1944: 141) ironic thesis that while the 
(neoliberal) was planned, state intervention was unplanned. As the 
recapitalisation of the banks on 13 October 2008 shows, every effort will be 
made to cure structural contradictions within the limits set by credit-led 
financialisation entrenched by the passive revolution ‘since no social formation 
will ever admit that it has been superseded’ (Gramsci, 1971: 178). A crisis does 
not automatically provoke a war of movement. Previously occupied positionings 
are not readily abandoned, even if, like neoliberalism’s deregulated financial 
architecture, it stands in ruins (Gramsci, 1971: 235). After all, transfers of 
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revenue through the financialisation and commodification of social goods has 
had a disciplining effect on labour, weakening its collective power as a counter-
force to the compulsory structuring of social life by capital.  
But any gain made in a war of position is always vulnerable to internal 
dissolution and counter-attack. Neoliberalism met resistance along the way, 
most spectacularly in the miner’s strike of 1984/5 and social movements like 
the seismic anti-Poll Tax rebellion, but also in less dramatic tactical struggles in 
mundane settings like the workplace and the neighbourhood (Leitner, Peck and 
Sheppard, 2007; England and Ward, 2007). While a mini-wave of occupations 
against workplace closure and redundancies spread in spring 2009 from 
Waterford, Belfast, Enfield, Basildon and Dundee as an emergent form of 
collective resistance, vulnerability to over-exposure to the credit-nexus might 
generate social movements for welfare protection in a national-popular 
architecture of counter-hegemonic force, as Gramsci (and Polanyi) might have 
anticipated (Burawoy, 2003). If the ideology of neoliberalism has been much 
less important than the financialisation of everyday life as a dull compulsion it 
remains to be seen which forms of collective resistance are appropriate to the 
present crisis, located somewhere between the wars of movement and the 
wars of positioning.  
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1
  For Gramsci (1971: 232) military analogies cannot be translated directly into social and political 
strategies: ‘to fix one’s mind on the military model is the mark of a fool: politics, here too, must have 
priority over its military aspect, and only politics creates the possibility for manoeuvre and movement’. 
